Editor’s note: This article is the second installment in a three-piece essay. Parts one and three can be viewed here and here, respectively.

Thus far we have watched Storck attempt to prove that Locke’s hypothetical government rests on a dichotomy between the sacred and secular. As both Reynolds and the case of the animal sacrifices show, however, natural reason is not a “closed system” that excludes from consideration supernatural truths necessary for governance.

The danger of magistrates who reason wrongly, or misconstrue what constitutes a threat to the common good, does, of course, remain. But this is present in all human governments. The difference in Locke’s model is that the government cannot penalize religious beliefs at all. And it may only penalize religious practices if they threaten the common good. Neither of these protections exists under establishments.

To better understand the compatibility of religion and politics in a Lockean polity, we must examine the philosophy behind the Letter. Locke reiterates throughout his writings that the natural law must be understood as a “Declaration” of “the Will of God” [1] or else no one has any real reason to obey it or the human laws based on it. [2] Furthermore, Locke argues that the existence of a single, omnipotent, omniscient God can be demonstrated with certainty. [3] In a Lockean regime, then, citizens and magistrates are taught that they live in a world where the natural depends on the supernatural so that moral law—and the government’s declaration of it—has real authority.

Locke’s attitude towards atheists proves this claim. Although tolerant governments cannot impose particular beliefs about God, they can penalize those who deny God's existence, since it is so evident. Thus, the Letter maintains that governments are free to refuse toleration to atheists. [4] Indeed, Locke’s 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina state unequivocally that atheists are not to be tolerated, and many American state governments continued this practice well into the 19th century, some even to this day.

Moreover, since the Letter only forbids “Force and Compulsion” in matters of religion, magistrates in a tolerant government remain free to have “a charitable” care for religion. “Magistracy,” Locke writes, “does not oblige [anyone] to put off either Humanity or Christianity.” [5] This is an important distinction. Only the state’s official jurisdiction is confined to the natural law. In other words, magistrates may inform their arguments by consulting clergymen, Scripture, and Tradition. They may proselytize, teach Christian truth, and use Christian arguments on the floor of Congress. But laws and decisions, when promulgated, must be framed according to the dictates of natural law.

By enforcing the natural law in this way, a tolerant government encourages virtue in its citizens. Virtue is necessary for several reasons, Locke argues, among them the fact that “Lusts … hinder an impartial examination” and “real imbracing” of “the true Religion.”  By subduing “Lusts … Luxury and Debauchery,” magistrates “bring Sobriety, Peaceableness, Industry and Honesty into fashion” and foster a citizenry better able to judge between churches. [6]

Locke carefully points out, however, that this emphasis on the reasonableness of God’s existence and the natural law does not mean that “natural religion” is sufficient for government. Crucially, he argues that, although unassisted reason can know God’s existence, it can’t know with certainty that there exists a future state in which we will be accountable for our actions. [7] And since God’s power in eternity is the ultimate grounding of moral authority for Locke, [8] this means that reason, apart from revelation, lacks the necessary power to establish morality on its true foundations.

The question, then, is how belief in orthodox divine revelation can best be propagated. Locke, for his part, offered several compelling arguments that freedom would accomplish this end better than coercion.

If the goal of a religious establishment is not merely to prop up the state, but to save souls, Locke asks, how can coercing men into belief of the reigning party’s orthodoxy be effective? Under this arrangement, the state (possessing temporal power) is more likely to influence the church than vice-versa, and since when have the men who excel at the art of politics been notable for their theological insights?

Furthermore, Locke makes the case that government can have no power over matters of faith because coercion cannot possibly inculcate true faith—much less saving faith. [9] In fact, he asks, isn’t it more likely to produce hypocrisy and resentment of Christianity? [10] Moreover, giving government the power to save souls would so conflate the purposes of church and state as to make the two institutions indistinguishable, to the detriment of both. [11] Lastly, revelation and reason both make clear that no person has the right or ability to “so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other.” [12] Using government force to establish a religious monopoly encourages intellectual and spiritual laziness, not only on behalf of the people, but of the clergy and government as well.

If Storck wishes to argue that force can make for more sincere and vibrant faith than freedom, he must answer each of these arguments.


[1] Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §135

[2] There are few points about which Locke is more adamant throughout his writings: “[T]he only true touchstone of moral rectitude,” he says, is “the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hands rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender,” Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXVIII, §8; Ibid, Book I, Ch. III,  §12

[3] Ibid, Book IV, Ch. X, §1-6; Ibid, Bk IV, Ch XXVII, §23

[4] Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 52-53. Storck wrote previously that Locke “was not necessarily concerned with the theological question of the existence of God, but simply with the instrumental value of belief as a means of promoting honesty in social conduct.” This interpretation reveals a feeble grasp of Locke’s thought. Among many other things, an entire chapter of the Essay is devoted to proving God’s existence. And as I show from the Essay (see n2, above), Locke held that the instrumental value of belief in God is a consequence of the truth of God’s existence.

[5] Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 14, 26, 46

[6] Ibid, 94-97

[7] Locke, Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 203-204

[8] Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. XXVIII, §8; Book I, Ch. III,  §12

[9] “The Civil Magistrate’s … Power consists only in outward force: But true and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward Force.” Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 13, 31-32

[10] Ibid, 8-12; 89-91

[11] Ibid, 69-76

[12] Ibid, 13